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ABSTRACT
Governments have been slow to address climate change. If non-governmental 
agents share a responsibility in light of the slow pace of government action then 
it is a collective responsibility. I examine three models of collective 
responsi-bility, especially Iris Young’s social connection model, and assess 
their value for identifying a collective, among all emitters, that can share 
responsibility. These models can help us better understand both the growth 
of the movement to divest from fossil fuels and the nature of responsibility 
for collective action problems. Universities and colleges share a responsibility 
because they occupy similar positions of, among other things, power and 
privilege.
KEYWORDS
Climate change ethics, divestment, collective responsibility, Iris Young, 
social connection responsibility, group agency
Confronting climate change requires wide-scale cooperation among many 
agents. In other words, the responsibility is collective, a thought that is fairly 
uncontroversial. Rather, the controversial question concerns who comprises 
members of this collective. For instance, is it governments of the world or 
individual greenhouse-gas emitters (Johnson 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005; 
Godoy 2017)? Is it those who have historically caused the most pollution or 
those who can most easily afford to address the problem (Caney 2010)? 
Regarding the first question, world emissions arise from the uncoordinated 
activities of many in-dividuals, so it is understandable that governments are 
called upon to address this and other problems stemming from collective 
action. However, govern-ments have been slow or ineffective in 
addressing climate change, in part because of disagreement over responses 
to the second question. Some believe 
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that responsibility falls on individuals and other group agents in light of this 
shortcoming (Broome 2012; Cripps 2011; Hourdequin 2010; Jamieson 2007; 
Nolt 2011; Raterman 2012; Schwenkenbecher 2014; Singer 2002). This might 
entail protesting or speaking out against harmful policies, electing environ-
mentally conscious leaders and so on. But if this is not working, or working too 
slowly, then perhaps such agents have more direct duties. Many have already 
taken on responsibilities themselves, often with the hope that their own actions 
will encourage governments to act.1
For instance, since 2011 a growing number of institutions across the 
world, especially colleges, universities and other higher-education institutions 
(hereafter just ‘universities’), have questioned the ethical nature of investing 
in fossil fuels. There is a growing movement to divest endowments of such 
holdings. This is largely due to the efforts of 350.org, an international organi-
sation of interconnected local chapters committed to various climate issues. 
The Fossil Free campaign, as they call it, has been dubbed the fastest-growing 
divestment movement in history (Vaughan 2015).2 By 2015, 28 universities 
worldwide had already committed to divestment, adding to the list of cities, 
counties, countries, religious institutions, foundations and other institutions 
that have joined the movement.3 By the time of the twenty-first Conference of 
the Parties of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
in Paris 2015 (or COP 21 for short), over US$3.4 trillion had been divested by 
over 500 institutions (350.org 2016). The movement challenges the economic 
structures that encourage environmentally harmful behaviour by calling at-
tention to and questioning profits from fossil fuel investments. By divesting, 
institutions hope to influence public opinion and garner political will to help 
reduce the harmful impact of fossil fuel industries.
In what follows, I am interested in neither whether individual universities 
have a responsibility to divest, nor whether divestment is the best strategy 
among all possible strategies to thwart climate change. Rather, I am interested 
in how the divestment movement illustrates a form of collective responsibility 
that non-governmental agents can take up and share. Only collective action 
will reduce global emissions. But in what sense can agents so broadly dis-
tributed across the world form a collective or group that is capable of acting 
1. In this article, I refer to two types of individual agents: an individual person and a single 
group agent. A collection of agents may then refer to a collective of people, group agents 
or some mixture of the two. For instance, all endowment-holding universities constitute a 
collection of group agents. I also consistently use ‘group’ rather than ‘collective’ to refer to 
an agent that is distinct from individual members.
2. This movement is modelled after that which helped bring an end to South African apartheid. 
Other divestment movements exist or have existed. However, here I focus solely on the 
Fossil Free campaign.
3. See the Fossil Free homepage: http://gofossilfree.org (accessed 11 Mar 2015). Norway is 
the first country to pledge divestment from coal. While a number of institutions and even 
individuals have divested, my focus here will be on universities.
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together? I discuss three methods in which philosophers understand collective 
responsibility –  what I refer to as the ‘group agent’, ‘obvious-and-reasonable’ 
and ‘social connection’ models.4 Respectively, individuals share responsibility, 
first, when they are members of a group agent; second, when it is obvious to 
a reasonable person that they ought to act collectively to effect a favourable 
outcome; and third, in the same degree and proportion as their connection to 
structures that produce harm. These are not competing methods, but mutually 
reinforcing. Below, I discuss the ‘group agent’ and the ‘obvious-and-reasona-
ble’ models. Both are helpful but face limitations on their own. Following on 
from this, I focus on Iris Young’s ‘social connection’ model of responsibility 
(Young 2011) to argue that agents share responsibilities when they occupy 
similar social positions within an interconnecting and overlapping network of 
agency; they meet them by acting with others who occupy similar social posi-
tions. Next, I use Young’s model to examine fossil fuel divestment. Because of 
their shared social position, endowment-holding universities make up a collec-
tive that can together share responsibility to divest. In the final section, I offer a 
conclusion that raises some questions about the nature of shared responsibility 
and joint actions. Climate change challenges many of our traditional moral 
concepts, such as responsibility. Applying these three models to the divestment 
movement offers us a chance to rethink what it can mean to share responsibil-
ity for large problems of collective action.
FROM GROUP AGENTS TO RANDOM COLLECTIVES
When responsibility is collective, how do we identify members of that col-
lective? In this section, I discuss two possible answers that are useful in the 
context of climate change. The first is the ‘group agent’ model. According to 
what Wringe calls the ‘agency principle’ (Wringe 2010), only agents can hold 
collective responsibilities; likewise, the group agent model claims that only 
group agents have collective responsibilities. By group agent, I mean a col-
lection of agents that share a capacity for making decisions to act based on 
shared desires and beliefs.5 This principle restricts responsibility to those col-
4. This survey is not meant to be exhaustive of all forms of collective responsibility, but to 
address one of the major challenges we face when thinking about collective responsibility 
in this context, namely, how the loosely connected collection of carbon emitters across the 
world can share responsibilities. I discuss these three approaches in a different and far more 
truncated form in Godoy (2017).
5. I take this definition from List and Pettit (2011: 19–41). However, there is a wide range of 
literature regarding the constitution of group agents and collectives, and what responsibilities 
may follow from such a constitution. For instance, List and Pettit align themselves closely 
with, among others, French (1984), who describes the organized decision-making procedures 
that qualify groups to hold responsibility (List and Pettit 2011: 11); Gilbert (2000) attempts to 
define what constitutes a ‘plural subject’ relying on a particular account of shared intentions; 
and May (1992) focuses on the role that shared desires or goals play in sharing responsibility.
ERIC S. GODOY
4
Environmental Values 26.6
lectives that are organised enough to form distinct agents; many, but not all, 
corporations and governing bodies do. However, there is an exception to the 
agency principle that involves what List and Pettit refer to as ‘responsibilizing’ 
(List and Pettit 2011: 157, 193). If a company has not established, for instance, 
rational procedures by which it makes decisions – one of the necessary condi-
tions for group agency according to, among others, List and Pettit – the public 
still ought to hold it responsible for any harm it causes since doing so will 
encourage the company to develop those procedures. We punish and praise 
children for similar reasons. In both instances, there is potential for agency 
to develop, and this potential is grounds for holding the company or child 
responsible.
Many believe that group agents, such as corporations, should be addressing 
climate change, and indeed, many such agents have adopted environmentally 
minded policies. However, there are limitations to thinking about collective 
responsibility for climate change in terms of these types of agents. First, group 
agents that presently exist may be slow to act or resistant to address climate 
change since they were originally formed with a particular purpose in mind; 
most likely, this purpose had nothing to do with climate change. For instance, 
libraries are created to loan books and oil companies to profit from selling oil. 
Neither was meant to confront a changing climate. Governments were formed 
to address a wide range of issues and climate change is just one that they con-
sider among many. Sometimes groups are slow to act because it takes time 
to recognise, incorporate and prioritise new values in their decision-making 
processes, or to develop or formalise such procedures if these values are new. 
For decades now, governments have deliberated over how concerns about our 
warming planet should influence their actions and policies. But sometimes 
new values are not even compatible with those the group had in mind when it 
was formed. (This is certainly true for any fossil fuel companies whose aim to 
generate profits by selling fossil fuels is at odds with the health of the global 
atmosphere.) In these cases, the public can apply external pressure – or, for 
members, internal pressure – to encourage groups to reform their values or 
act more quickly. Slow reaction time and resistance to change are not intrinsic 
characteristics of group agents, but rather a fact about those currently in exist-
ence which might take up responsibility for climate change. 
This leads to a second limitation. If group agents are the only way to think 
about collective responsibility for climate change, then an individual member 
frustrated by the sluggish pace of their group has little other recourse aside 
from helping to expedite its action. A group agent meets its responsibilities by 
taking group action, and only certain people within a group are authorised to 
act on its behalf (List and Pettit 2011: 35–36). For instance, those who work 
in human resources or in accounting at BP cannot apologise on behalf of the 
company after an oil spill. Nor is it reasonable to think such employees should 
don biohazard suits and clean up the spill themselves. When groups act slowly, 
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as they have with climate change, it is useful to have a model of collective 
responsibility that allows for alternatives to group agents.
Finally, just as no one individual agent is capable of making a significant 
environmental impact on their own, many group agents are incapable of mak-
ing a significant impact on their own. Large corporations who are leaders 
within their industry may be in a position to make changes that ripple through 
to affect the policies of competitors and suppliers, but most group agents are 
not large industry leaders (more on this below). Similarly, high-emitting coun-
tries such as the United States may be in a position to facilitate cooperation by 
making changes to their emissions policies. However, making an impact on 
climate change requires the cooperation of other states too. The group agent 
approach alone is therefore too restrictive for defining collective responsibility 
as only attributable to group agents. Many large group agents, such as gov-
ernments, do not seem to be responding quickly enough to climate change. 
Groups take time to adjust to new problems, formulate responses and convince 
other groups to do likewise.
The second approach to collective responsibility is the ‘obvious-and-
reasonable’ approach. This begins with individuals rather than groups. I take 
‘obvious-and-reasonable’ from Held, who argues that even random collectives 
of people may be held responsible for transforming themselves into a group 
capable of action, ‘when the action called for in a given situation is obvious to 
the reasonable person and when the expected outcome of the action is clearly 
favourable’ (Held 1970: 476, emphasis added). This collective can be, for in-
stance, passers-by who encounter a person pinned under the heavy rubble of 
a collapsed building. The passers-by can be held individually responsible for 
failing to act together to lift the heavy rubble and save the trapped person 
(ibid.: 479–480).6 It is obvious to the reasonable person that this would pre-
vent a death, and clearly the favourable outcome is the survival of the trapped 
person. In other words, the obvious-and-reasonable account does not require 
group agency or its potential. This offers an advantage over the group agent 
approach since it allows for more types of collectives, not just potential group 
agents, to hold responsibilities, especially new collectives that assemble in re-
sponse to a particular problem.
But does Held’s model violate the agency principle since it requires action 
of a collective which is not yet an agent? Perhaps agency is not necessary for 
responsibility. Wringe (2010) has recently challenged the agency principle out-
right by arguing that obligations can fall on the global collective of all human 
beings even though they cannot constitute a group agent. He draws a distinction 
6. Held’s position is similar to that of May, who calls collectives with the potential to become 
more organized agents ‘putative groups’ (May 1992: 105–122). Cripps also invokes May’s 
putative groups in order to argue for what she calls ‘weak collective responsibility’ (Cripps 
2011: 174–175), although she makes some distinctions between her position and May’s 
regarding the distribution of responsibility among a putative group (ibid.: 177).
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between the subject (the ‘global collective’) and addressee (individual human 
agents) of such obligations. According to Wringe, without a global group 
agent, individuals would be the addressees of obligations to reduce emissions 
and would have to ‘do things which are appropriately related to the carrying 
out of the action whose performance would constitute fulfilment of the collec-
tive obligation’ (ibid.: 227). This sounds consistent with Held’s understanding 
of the responsibility that befalls even a random collective. Schwenkenbecher 
(2013) disagrees with Wringe since, although joint duties are possible among 
collectives without agency, those collectives must be capable of joint action. 
By acting jointly, she means people who act ‘because they believe that these 
others will contribute their share toward the joint goal’ (ibid.: 313).7 Since all 
humans on Earth cannot act jointly, they are not collectively responsible for 
reducing emissions.
I agree with Schwenkenbecher, who reveals a shortcoming of the obvi-
ous-and-reasonable approach. While this approach works well for smaller 
collectives such as passers-by or other strangers who happen to encounter 
harm, problems arise when we use it to think about climate change or other is-
sues that are global in scale. Bates raises a related concern with Held’s account 
regarding larger collectives with complicated obligations (say, to overthrow a 
corrupt government): ‘each individual would seem to be a member of a practi-
cally unlimited number of “random collections”, and it is at least unclear as to 
which of these random collections is failing to [act]’ (Bates 1991: 104). The 
random collection of emitters is similarly too large and loosely connected to 
ever be a candidate for joint action, especially since it is not clear with whom 
each individual should be acting or where the boundaries of collectives begin 
and end. In other words, there is a practical problem of joint action when col-
lectives get too big or too dispersed. But perhaps there is no reason to think of 
all emitters as a single collective. In what follows, I show how social connec-
tion can identify a collection of emitters – among a vast global collective – who 
can act together because they share similar social positions and responsibilities 
that follow from those positions. Such collectives are not group agents, yet 
they are capable of acting together to confront climate change. 
SOCIAL CONNECTION RESPONSIBILITY AND CLIMATE CHANGE
Young (2011) offers a model of responsibility that is shared among those who 
are socially connected to structural injustices. This form of harm arises from 
seemingly innocent everyday routines. Traditional notions of responsibil-
ity single out individual agents that cause harm; yet structural injustices are 
so causally complex that identifying individual offending agents does little 
7. Those familiar with Gilbert (1992) will see a similarity between her work and this definition 
of joint action.
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to correct or prevent the harm they encourage from recurring. Young uses 
the apparel industry’s reliance on sweatshop labour as an illustration (ibid.: 
125–134).
Individual sweatshop managers who beat their employees, deny them 
access to water or toilets, or commit similarly atrocious acts are themselves 
guilty of causing harm. However, it would be missing something important 
about the situation to stop at singling out such agents. There is a complex chain 
of interdependent social processes that encourages and perpetuates the persis-
tence of sweatshops. It spans from consumers to retail stores, to global apparel 
companies, to their contracted manufacturers and supply chains. Authorities 
may identify and remove abusive managers or close offending factories, but 
the global demand for cheap clothing and high profits ensures that more will 
spring up in their place. If host countries begin regulating labour practices in 
such a way that increases labour costs, companies will likely relocate sweat-
shops to countries with weaker regulations. 
In addition to blaming individually guilty agents, Young suggests that all 
those socially connected to these processes – from consumers to labourers 
– share responsibility to improve background conditions and structures that in-
fluence individual actions (ibid.: 95–122). Such responsibility can only be met 
through collective action. People are socially connected by virtue of their com-
mon participation in interdependent social processes, or ‘mutually influencing 
institutions and practices through which people enact their projects and seek 
their happiness and … [through this participation] they affect the conditions 
under which others act, often profoundly’ (ibid: 139). In other words, when 
considering structural harm, we should begin with the assumption that respon-
sibility emerges from how we already work together, quasi-intentionally, in 
ways that give rise to patterns of behaviour by which we cooperate with one 
another to achieve intertwined ends, rather than with the assumption that we 
act in isolation, and that we are only responsible for the harm we individually 
cause. In fact, our actions often have a strong influence on the actions of those 
to whom we are socially connected.
There is a clear analogy between the network of processes enabling sweat-
shop labour and that enabling climate change. A single consumer can avoid 
buying apparel produced under unjust conditions. The good intentions behind 
this abstention may be morally admirable, but it leaves the structures reproduc-
ing the injustice intact. Similarly, a single philosopher who refuses to fly to a 
conference in order to give a paper does little to prevent the harm associated 
with climate change. Social connection responsibility is met by acting with 
other agents to transform harmful structures rather than by acting as an iso-
lated, individual agent.
This notion of responsibility is more open-ended than what we might call 
duties, which outline specific actions one must take (ibid.: 143). Accordingly, 
Young offers four parameters which act as guidelines when thinking through 
ERIC S. GODOY
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possible ways to meet social connection responsibility: power, privilege, inter-
est and collective ability (ibid. 144–147).8 Each of these is derived from the 
relative positions that agents occupy within the interconnected framework of 
social practices. Below I discuss how these parameters define narrower col-
lections of agents among a much wider global collective that shares similar 
responsibilities to combat climate change through joint action.
The first parameter is power. Some agents have more power than oth-
ers to affect structures (ibid.: 144). Responsibility is often considered to be 
commensurate with power (Jonas 1984: x). I cannot have a responsibility to 
single-handedly bring an end to fossil fuel extraction since it is beyond my 
power to do so.9 Power to affect the climate varies according to one’s position 
within the network of social structures that encourage fossil fuel use; the nature 
of one’s moral responsibility varies accordingly. Such power is understood as 
relative to other positions within this network of agents. Governments, busi-
nesses and individuals all have different power to influence social structures. 
Different individuals have different powers depending on whether they are oil 
company executives or middle-class commuters. 
Likewise, when a leading company demands that its supply chains adopt 
new manufacturing standards, the effect often ripples through the entire indus-
try. Many manufacturers and suppliers work with multiple corporations. Apple 
shares factories with Samsung, McDonald’s shares suppliers with Burger King 
and so on. A ripple effect was anticipated, for instance, when McDonald’s 
announced plans to curb its use of chicken treated with antibiotics, since 
those who raise chicken for McDonald’s also supply many other companies 
(Kesmodel et al. 2015). One such supplier is Tyson, the largest meatpacker in 
the United States. According to the social connection model, such leaders have 
different responsibilities from smaller businesses, which correspond to their 
differences in power.
An individual agent, by contrast, has very little power to curb the world’s 
carbon emissions. A lone joyrider enthusiast’s decision to go for a drive on a 
sunny Sunday afternoon will ultimately have a negligible effect on the atmos-
pheric concentration of carbon; while governments can pass laws to increase 
fuel-efficiency standards, corporations can create more fuel-efficient cars and 
so on (Johnson 2003; Sinnott-Armstrong 2005). If individuals wish to effect 
change, they must put pressure on agents who do have power to influence 
social processes. In order for this pressure to be effective, individuals must act 
8. I focus on the four parameters that Young discusses, but perhaps there are others. For 
instance, Cripps (2013) discusses three types of collectives – ‘The Young’, ‘The Able’ and 
‘Polluters’ – that share some collective responsibilities. Although she does not discuss these 
groupings in terms of Young’s four parameters, there is clear overlap. I do not here have the 
space to discuss whether Cripps suggests any additional parameters by which to locate shared 
responsibilities.
9. In other words, ought implies can, though Jonas believes modern technology requires us to 
modify this Kantian dictate (Jonas 1984: 128–129).
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with each other. When agents act together – say by joining a movement – they 
increase their power and can more effectively encourage leaders to construct 
new laws, persuade companies to abandon carbon-heavy practices and so on. 
The same is true of individual states or corporations. Avoiding further serious 
global warming requires wide-scale cooperation among many agents. States 
can use their powers to convince other states to adopt laws or sign international 
treaties to limit emissions. 
This means that, according to the social connection model, individuals are 
responsible not only for the power they presently have, but also for the power 
gained from acting with other agents. Agents who occupy similar positions of 
power in relation to a form of structural injustice will have similar responsi-
bilities, since the limits to effect change are relative to one’s power. Power is 
therefore one guideline that can help define a collective of agents who share 
responsibility. Governments can use their powers to work with other govern-
ments, companies with other companies and individuals with individuals.10
The second parameter is privilege. One might assume that privilege is a 
derivative of power, and indeed they are often connected. However, power 
refers to the ability to influence structures, while privilege refers to the benefits 
gained from one’s position relative to others within a social network (Young 
2011: 145). Social-structural processes give rise to positions of relative privi-
lege or disadvantage. Young cites as an example of such privilege the low 
prices and large selections of apparel that Western consumers enjoy, which 
is itself a by-product of sweatshop labour (ibid.: 145). The institutions and 
processes that give rise to climate change create similar positions. The world’s 
affluent citizens consume fossil fuels at relatively low prices since many of the 
environmental costs are excluded from what they pay. While many are vulner-
able to the effects of climate change, the world’s poor are particularly so, and 
face additional burdens (IPCC 2014: 31; Mearns and Norton 2010: 18–23). 
The affluent are more likely to escape dangerous storms, have access to food 
during droughts and live in states that build infrastructure to mitigate the ef-
fects of climate change. 
The world’s affluent are also able to reduce some emissions with relative 
ease: by installing solar panels, driving greener vehicles, buying organic pro-
duce, reducing the meat and dairy in their diet and so on. But doing so prevents 
relatively little harm. Social connection responsibility is met not by making 
changes to one’s own lifestyle, but by acting with others to transform structures 
that encourage the individual lifestyle choices that lead to harm. Those who 
10. I mention a horizontal rather than vertical sharing of responsibilities since I believe it is 
easier for agents of equal power to share responsibilities. Though there may be other reasons 
for individuals to share responsibilities with corporations, rich nations with poor nations, 
and so on. However, the manner in which agents from vastly different positions can share 
responsibilities with one another will become far more difficult to assess. Indeed, this was one 
of the difficulties with the obvious-and-reasonable approach. Thanks to Maeve McKeown for 
helping me refine this point.
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occupy similar positions of privilege constitute a collective, the members of 
which share responsibility for understanding their privilege and finding a pro-
ductive way of ensuring others are not harmed by it. It is difficult to raise moral 
questions about one’s own privilege. Those who do so are especially vulner-
able to arguments that justify their advantages. Gardiner calls this temptation 
‘moral corruption’ (Gardiner 2011: 45–48). Those with similar privileges share 
a responsibility to refute these arguments and resist such corruption.11 
In other words, the global affluent must keep in mind their interest, the 
third parameter, in confronting climate change. Those who benefit from privi-
lege often have an interest in maintaining it. Likewise, those who suffer greatly 
from injustice have a particular interest in confronting it, one that is quite dif-
ferent from that of those who feel its effects more mildly (Young 2011: 145). 
Workers who are actually employed by sweatshops and communities who 
stand to lose their homes due to sea level rise are in better positions to un-
derstand the realities of this harm than those who consider them from a safe 
distance. Becoming a victim of harm does not require one to forfeit agency, 
although vulnerability conditions responsibility. Those in similar positions are 
more likely to share similar desires, and those who share desires for common 
ends are more likely to act together to achieve those ends.12 This is impor-
tant for social connection responsibility, which requires people to act together. 
Keeping interest in mind also guards against paternalistic attitudes that those 
in powerful or privileged positions are wont to take – that is, by taking re-
sponsibility for those suffering rather than taking up responsibility with them. 
Often the powerless become victims of power or the powerful, who shape 
structures to the benefit or privilege of some over others. Meeting social con-
nection responsibility should not take the form of trying to merely wash one’s 
hands of guilt, but instead of examining one’s interest in an injustice. This 
involves questioning one’s power and privileges, and by engaging in dialogue 
with those who have different stakes – for instance, those who have a direct 
interest in guarding themselves against actual harm.
The final parameter is collective ability, which in the context of our dis-
cussion refers to the ability to act as, or like, a group agent. It is with this 
parameter that we see most clearly how the social connection model is an ad-
dition to the prior two models. A collection of agents that is already capable 
of acting together (broadly construed) has a different responsibility from those 
that do not (ibid.: 147). Universities, for instance, played a big role in the anti-
sweatshop movement. (In the next section I will discuss how these institutions 
11. The ‘perfect moral storm’ of climate change makes us especially vulnerable to an instance 
of corruption that Gardiner refers to as ‘intergenerational buck-passing’ – when present 
generations refuse to act for the sake of future generations. Here I use the term in the wider 
sense of agents subverting moral language and arguments for their own purposes (Gardiner 
2011: 46).
12. We might say that this creates greater solidarity, which according to some is a prerequisite for 
acting together. See e.g. Feinberg (1968).
SHARING RESPONSIBILITY FOR DIVESTING FROM FOSSIL FUELS
11
Environmental Values 26.6
have once again taken the front line, this time in the movement to counteract 
climate change.) Students and faculty pressured administrators to adopt stricter 
labour standards for manufacturers of their team uniforms and other clothing 
sold on campus, thereby effecting changes in the apparel industry (ibid.: 147). 
Universities often have governance structures that are more democratic than 
those typically found in the corporate world. Students, faculty and staff often 
have a say in decision-making. Neighbourhoods, streets and even apartment 
buildings are also collectives that can more easily develop mechanisms facili-
tating joint action under the right circumstances. Variance in these mechanisms 
or their possibility entails different responsibilities. 
 Recall that the problem identified above was the practical difficulties of lo-
cating a collective among all emitters who share responsibilities to act together. 
The social connection model and Young’s four parameters are useful for iden-
tifying agents who occupy similar positions relative to the injustices resulting 
from climate change; they narrow down the scope of what could otherwise be 
a limitless number of random collectives or a nebulous ‘global collective’ of all 
moral agents on the planet. Socially connected agents then take up responsibil-
ity by acting together with the aim of transforming the structures perpetuating 
climate change; since no individual agent has the power to do this alone, joint 
action is important. Yet in acting together, socially connected agents need not 
transform themselves into a group agent, though doing so may certainly help 
to achieve common ends more effectively. 
I now turn to the fossil fuel divestment movement for an example of so-
cial connection responsibility in practice. The divestment movement and its 
proponents encourage universities to divest, in part, by highlighting the rela-
tive social position that endowment-holding institutions occupy. No divesting 
organisation will effect climate change measurably on its own, but by acting 
together, universities put pressure on the political and economic structures en-
couraging carbon emissions. Currently, a number of universities have joined 
the divestment movement, although by doing so, they are not becoming part 
of a formal group agent.
THE DIVESTMENT MOVEMENT AND ENDOWMENT-HOLDING 
UNIVERSITIES
An organisation ‘joins’ the Fossil Free movement by divesting. But in doing 
so, it does not become part of a larger group agent; in fact, it is meaningful that 
they do not. When distinct agents join the movement for their own, sometimes 
different, reasons, they send a more powerful political message than that which 
would come from an individual. I believe that the growth of this movement has 
been encouraged, implicitly, by a social connection model of responsibility. 
Universities are pressured to join because they belong to a collection of agents 
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that benefit financially from fossil fuels and that have the ability, collectively, 
to exert pressure for change. Young’s four parameters are again useful to elu-
cidate why responsibility has here taken the form it has.
First, universities have limited power to affect the structures that encourage 
climate change. They cannot change laws or write public policy, as can gov-
ernments, though they can teach courses and fund research to help influence 
public opinion. While not all universities have this kind of clout, many have 
endowments, and each school possesses the power to divest its own endow-
ment of fossil fuels. Plans to divest, considered individually, are not likely to 
slow climate change to a measureable degree – as is the case for a single person 
who refuses to fly or drive. Analysts have pointed out that it is unlikely that 
even the entire movement will hurt the profits of fossil fuel companies. But ad-
vocates claim the movement’s power lies in its political, rather than financial, 
effects. Divesting expresses disapproval for obtaining benefits at the cost of 
perpetuating great harm on present and future generations.13
Because each agent that joins the movement increases the strength of this 
message, those universities that might influence others by divesting have faced 
stronger pressure – not unlike industry leaders in the corporate world. Sit-ins 
and other forms of protest at top universities such as Harvard and Yale have 
been well-covered by journalists, bloggers and tweeters.14 When Harvard’s 
president Drew Faust published the university’s reasons against divestment, 
it was the subject of heavy public scrutiny. For instance, Harvard and others 
have suggested that institutions retain more power by holding on to invest-
ments in fossil fuels since doing so gives them a seat at the company table as 
a shareholder (Faust 2015). However, it is not clear how shareholder action 
could be effective since the business model of such companies is so deeply 
dependent upon fossil fuels. A strong enough contingent of concerned share-
holders may encourage companies to shift some attention to renewables, but 
a third of global oil reserves, half of gas reserves and over 80 per cent of coal 
reserves should remain unused in order to meet a warming limit of 2 degrees 
Celsius (McGlade and Ekins 2015). It is unlikely that concerned voices can 
surpass those that are merely interested in maximising profits while they still 
can through the tried and tested business model of extracting fossil fuels.15 As 
agents who share the power to divest, universities can share responsibility to 
collectively put pressure on those structures enabling climate change. Their 
13. For more on the communicative value of individuals acting unilaterally to fight climate 
change, see Hourdequin (2011).
14. See the Divest Harvard homepage: http://divestharvard.com/ (accessed 4 Jul 2015).
15. It is possible that with enough momentum, shareholder activism can illustrate an effective 
form of social connection responsibility (thanks to an anonymous reviewer for this thought). 
My point is simply that past efforts seem to have demonstrated that building this momentum 
is unlikely. However, recent attempts by shareholders have been more successful than in the 
past (McKenna 2016).
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social position, in the context of a growing movement of divesting universities, 
amplifies the meaning of this act.
Second, universities share a privilege that they can easily give up in order 
to provoke change. Profits from fossil fuels finance a portion of their operating 
costs through endowments, while they are insulated from the worst environ-
mental costs of these investments. The divestment movement challenges, in 
a very public way, the moral status of benefits reaped from fossil fuels. This 
challenge finds a basis in the principle: One ought to surrender a privilege that 
is linked to harm if one can do so without incurring a great cost. This is a ver-
sion of a well-cited principle in moral philosophy regarding harm prevention. 
The moral choices we make often come with sacrifices, but some sacrifices 
are worth the cost; for instance, saving a drowning child is generally regarded 
as worth the cost of getting one’s clothes wet.16 Analysts have determined that 
divestment will not significantly harm operating budgets, and that in some 
instances portfolios devoid of fossil fuels even outperformed those with them 
(Zeller 2015). As more universities decide to divest, it becomes increasingly 
difficult to argue that these investments are necessary for effective functioning. 
Universities challenge their own privileged positions by publicly relinquishing 
their financial ties to fossil fuels; they send a powerful political message by 
doing so. 
Third, universities share a special interest in the good of their communities 
and the future well-being of their members. Promoting this well-being is the 
aim of the divestment movement. The social role of a university is, in part, to 
educate and to advance knowledge, goals that are inherently future oriented 
and melioristic. University missions often refer to educating the future lead-
ers of society. We can find similar principles reflected in religious institutions 
and philanthropic foundations, both of which have also joined the divestment 
movement in notable numbers.17 An institution publicly pledged to some good 
sends a different message by divesting than would, say, a for-profit corpora-
tion. Even when non-profit institutions divest for financial reasons, there is a 
moral dimension to their act since everything they do is evaluated in light of 
their mission and the role that non-profit institutions play in society. The di-
vestment movement has leveraged this interest to increase the impact of each 
university that announces plans to divest.
Look once more at the remarks by Harvard’s president, Drew Faust. He 
argued that an endowment is an educational resource that should be used 
solely to advance the institution’s ability to educate. He writes: ‘[w]e should 
16. Perhaps the most frequently cited example of this principle comes from Singer (1972). He 
formulates the principle as follows: ‘If it is in our moral power to prevent something bad 
from happening, without thereby sacrificing anything of comparable moral importance, we 
ought, morally, to do it’ (ibid.: 231).
17. The Rockefeller Brothers Fund made headlines when it announced plans to rid their US$860 
million philanthropic fund of fossil fuel investments, most notably since the history of the 
family’s wealth is intimately linked to the oil industry (Schwartz 2014).
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… be very wary of steps intended to instrumentalize our endowment in ways 
that would appear to position the University as a political actor rather than an 
academic institution’ (Faust 2015). The problem with this reasoning is that 
refusing to divest also sends a political message; the divestment movement has 
politicised holding such endowments in the first place. If Harvard continues to 
maintain the largest endowment in the United States, and if it continues to ben-
efit from fossil fuel investments despite scientific evidence that there are more 
fuels in reserve than can be safely burned, then it will be forced to reconcile 
this choice with the purported interests it has in the future of its students and in 
improving the world through education.
In contrast, the University of Edinburgh released a statement against 
divestment in May 2015 only to retract and revise it later that month by an-
nouncing plans to begin a partial divestment of its shares in the three biggest 
fossil fuel producers, or ‘only where feasible alternative sources of energy 
exist, and where companies do not invest in low-carbon technologies’ (Brooks 
2015; Jeffery 2015). The reversal followed a ten-day student occupation of 
the school’s finance department. The university’s original stance involved 
claiming that it considered the interest of developing countries which lacked 
‘feasible alternatives to fossil fuels that can ensure power for basic needs, such 
as heating, clean water and refrigeration’; they called divestment an ‘easy priv-
ilege of the developed world’ (Jeffery 2015) – a misdirected attempt at taking 
responsibility for rather than with those suffering. However, developing coun-
tries are those most vulnerable to climate change, and thereby also have an 
interest in cutting global carbon emissions. The political act of divesting does 
not harm the developing world’s actual energy supply – recall the criticism of 
the movement’s efficacy that pointed out how profits from fossil fuels will re-
main unaffected. Rather, divestment sends a political message to government 
leaders about the dangers of continuing to ignore the true costs of carbon to 
present and future generations.
Finally, it is clear that universities already possess collective ability; that 
is, they already function as a group agent, often with highly democratic de-
liberative processes. On university campuses, the move to divest is mostly 
spearheaded by students and faculty. Both frequently have access to organised 
governance structures used to make collective decisions and liaise with other 
parts of the community. Shared governance makes it easier for universities to 
join the divestment movement. Each institution that considers divestment does 
so with the knowledge that other universities are likely to have similar delib-
erations within their communities, and that they are likely to consider similar 
reasons for joining the movement, though no substantial structures are in place 
for universities to deliberate with one another about divestment. Divesting 
does not imply that everyone should abandon fossil fuel use; it only implies 
that it is wrong for universities to continue to benefit from this privilege while 
others suffer. Each university divests as an individual agent, but does so as 
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part of a movement of agents that have similar powers over endowments from 
which they derive morally suspect privileges against their future interests.
CONCLUSION
My claim has been that the social connection model is a useful way to identify 
agents, among all carbon emitters, that can share responsibility in combat-
ting climate change by acting together. Doing so does not form a new group 
agent, but those who are socially connected can more easily act towards a com-
mon aim because they share power, privilege, interest and collective abilities. 
This is not true of the vast global collective of emitters. Both the group agent 
and obvious-and-reasonable approaches capture many of our moral intuitions 
about collective responsibility. Universities are often group agents, and as such 
they have responsibilities to address climate change when governments are 
acting too slowly. In fact, it should be obvious to the reasonable person that 
all emitters share some responsibilities, but it is unclear how these responsi-
bilities are fulfilled – how, for instance, all emitters can act together to meet a 
shared responsibility. The four parameters of the social connection model offer 
a way to imagine how this responsibility can be shared. They provide a map for 
agents that share similar positions and that can take similar actions to achieve 
collective aims.
My focus has been on comparing different frameworks of collective re-
sponsibility, which has left me room only to hint at some of the interesting 
metaphysical and linguistic questions they raise about the nature and meaning 
of shared responsibility, joint intentions  and collective agency. Others have 
written on these topics and I have referred to many of these discussions above. 
These questions are important and hotly debated. However, metaphysics and 
language need not always ‘trump moral arguments’ so long as there ‘good 
moral reasons’ to think about collective responsibility (Held 2011: 159–160). 
Universities have good moral reasons to take up responsibilities by divesting, 
especially in light of the slow government responses to global climate change, 
and the fact is that many are doing so. My task has been to better understand 
why this is so by elucidating the shape of the responsibility, not its neces-
sary content or its metaphysical assumptions – that is, not whether divesting is 
the best way to meet collective responsibility or whether this responsibility is 
properly understood as individual, collective or shared.18
I have also not discussed how social connection responsibility might operate 
in the absence of a growing social movement. By focusing on divestment, per-
haps I have selected a case in which it is easy to discern shared responsibilities. 
18. For additional discussions of the differences between individual, collective and shared 
responsibility, see Clowney (2014), Cripps (2011), May (1992), Schwenkenbecher (2013) 
and Young (2011).
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If so, I hope to have provided a clue for spotting social connection in less obvi-
ous cases. Problems as vast in scale as climate change require many agents, 
collective and individual, to work together. Because of their vast scale, many 
are connected to these problems; they are just not connected in the same way. 
Young’s model provides a method for dividing up the global collective into 
more manageable pieces so that, in the absence of a robust movement, it is 
more clear with whom we should be acting to create one.
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